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Preliminary Statement
Appellant submits

this brief in reply t0 the

submission 0f Appellee. Appellee’s

submission seeks t0 continue the unconstitutional usurpation 0f Appellant’s due process rights

and

rests

upon

assertions refuted

by

the record.

Factual Distortions
Appellee takes great liberty With the

facts. First,

it

ignores that

all

the requisite

information was available on Edgar. See
https://www.sec.g0V/cgi-bin/browse—

edgar? action=getcompany&CIK=OO0 1 43 3 82 1 &type=&dateb=&0wner=exclude&start=40&coun

t=40
Second, Appellee

still

ignores the fact that Appellant sold his shares t0

why he was owed the money they

PRM and that's

say he “misappropriated.” See

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1433 82 1/000 1 659 1 73 16000466/ahitp0sam1 20 1 60830_

V2.htm
There were facts in dispute.

With respect

to the conversion t0

evidence 0f a negative. There
“conversion.” Burden

Appellee

On the

is

CORIX, Appellee seems

zero evidence that Appellant

was 0n Appellee

t0

show

to

want Appellant

was involved

at all

to

show

during that

the contrary.

states:

substance, the District Court did not abuse

its

The

discretion.

Court did not preclude Zarinegar from proceeding pro

se, as

Zarinegar claims.

Rather, the District Court temporarily precluded Zarinegar from

arguments during the hearing on

May 21,

making

oral

2019, instead requiring that his recently

ﬁred counsel would make the oral arguments for Zarinegar and

1

District

PRM at the

hearing. In other words, consistent with

IRCP

11.3(b)(2), the District Court

conditioned the granting 0f the motion t0 Withdraw 0n Brian

Webb

Legal

remaining in the case long enough to provide oral argument on the motions

it

had

ﬁled and briefed, in order t0 prevent delay or prejudice to the Department Even if
had been an error, the District Court took additional actions to make sure to

there

avoid any prejudice to Zarinegar. After granting

summary judgment

for the

Department, the District Court did not enter ﬁnal judgment for another three

months, allowing Zarinegar more than adequate time t0 either obtain

new

counsel

or raise any issues pro se.

This

Again,

is

totally false.

at this time,

The order was already

in

when Appellant was allowed to

speak.

Appellant appeared by special appearance only t0 challenge jurisdiction.

The following statements

in the Appellee’s Brief are all

made up and d0 not have any

evidentiary support:

1.

May 2014,

Jack Combs, the managing partner of PRM, cold-called Rees 0f Boise,

Idaho, a retired

2.

Zarinegar advertised and sold

PRM securities also by way 0f a PPM, which he admits

he personally caused to be created and then reviewed and approved.
3.

Zarinegar

Who

orchestrated

all

aspects of the sale 0f securities to an Idaho resident,

including having his agents cold-call an Idaho resident, signing the seven contracts With the

Idaho resident, signing the ownership unit certiﬁcates for Rees, and accepting the
the Idaho resident.

money from

Reply

Appellant challenged personal jurisdiction. Tr. 74-75. The Court found that the issue was

waived, but then decided the issue 0n the merits. Tr. 79. There

and the judgment

is

no waiver and n0 jurisdiction

void.

is

There can be n0 waiver because “‘waiver’ does not operate retroactively so as
a void judgment.” Fisher

More

important,

made

in

“.
.

any cause,

.

v.

Crest Corp, 112 Idaho 741, 744, 735 P.2d 1052 (Idaho App. 1987).

[H]0wever

in

late this objection [t0 the jurisdiction]

necessarily the exercise ofjurisdiction.”

Thus
“It is

this

has been made, 0r

an inferior or appellate court 0f the United States,

and decided, before any court can move one further step

(1 838).

it

in the cause; as

any movement

“Where

Court cannot avoid the question 0f Whether the judgment

Manning

v.

must appear 0n the record 0f the

there

is

n0 jurisdiction

Appellant has n0 nexus with Idaho,

forum

state

and the

state's

litigation

is

void.

v.

much

such

supposed

Marathon, 458 U.S. 50

n0 judge; the proceeding

less a substantial one.

minimum contacts

such that maintenance 0f the

v.

state,

is

as nothing.”

Cir. 1932).

courts unless

0f fair play and substantial justice. Shaﬂer

Shoe C0.

court.” Pipe Line v

at all there is

Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948, 949 (6th

compelled t0 answer in a

is

Rhoda Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 718

impossible t0 prove jurisdiction exists absent a substantial nexus With the

jurisdiction exists

may be

must be considered

as voluntary subscription to license. A11 jurisdictional facts supporting claim that

(1 982).

t0 validate

suit

exist

No

defendant can be

among

defendant, the

does not offend traditional notions

Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203 (1977); International

State 0f Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 3 16 (1945). In deference t0 the sovereignty 0f the

3

forum's sister states, due process requires “that there be

some

act

by which

the defendant

purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum

invoking the beneﬁts and protections 0f its laws.” Hanson

See World- Wide Volkswagen Corp.
Shoe, 326 U.S.

distant litigation.

Hanson

question 0f “a

upon

restrictions “are

They
v.

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94, 297 (1980); International

v.

more than a guarantee 0f immunity from inconvenient or

are a consequence of territorial limitations

Denckla, 357 U.S.

little

more 0r a

at

little less.

25 1. Hence, the

on the power of the respective

minimum

Whether due process

is

contacts measure

International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.

whom it has no

Volkswagen, 444 U.S.

at

is

not a

satisﬁed must depend rather

the quality and nature 0f the activity in relation t0” the laws of the

individual with

thus

at 3 19.

Due process

States.”

v.

state,

forum

state.

A state cannot justiﬁably assert jurisdiction over an

constitutionally cognizable contacts 0r ties. World- Wide

294.

Nothing gave Appellant reason

to anticipate a suit outside

of his

face-to-face 0r even oral contact With any 0f the parties in Idaho. There

home
is

state.

He had no

n0 evidence

that

Appellant ever negotiated With anyone in Idaho or even sent mail there in connection with the
underlying dispute.

He

maintained n0 staff in the state 0f Idaho and as far as the record reveals,

he has never even Visited the

state.

Jurisdiction under these circumstances

would offend

the fundamental fairness

the touchstone of due process. This Court, therefore, should reverse the

with directions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the case.

B:

ES

:.E

1]..“

which

is

judgment and remand

Appellant did object to the out of state certificates as rank hearsay and renews that

The public-records exception

objection here.

the circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

167-68 (1988); United States

because Plaintiff basically
parties. See, e.g.,

0fAm.,

is

relying on

United States

v.

NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764,

them

for

at

Cir. 2005). It is inapplicable

Cir.

424 (9th

Cir. 1983);

2002) (afﬁrming the

it is

accord Orr

district court’s

summary judgment phase and noting

not rely 0n one of the exhibits “because

Rainey, 488 U.S. 153,

v.

summaries of hearsay statements made by

Pazsint, 703 F.2d 420,

778-79 (9th

0f exhibits that contained hearsay

C.

Beech Aircraﬁ‘ Corp.

Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 604 (7th

v.

when, as here,

t0 the hearsay rule is inapplicable

v.

third

Bank

exclusion

that the plaintiff could

inadmissible hearsay”).

Ihiludgmaﬂmjudimd
The judge was

speak, but this

was

prejudiced. Appellee says that Appellant

after the order

was

in.

was given

the opportunity t0

Appellant appeared by special appearance only t0

challenge jurisdiction and the prejudice continued. The judge should have recused himself; he

was prejudiced

entering the order; he further didn’t have the authority t0 rule

0n

his

own

challenged jurisdiction. In addition, the judge was a respondent on the motion t0 recuse.

The Code 0f Judicial Conduct, Rule

2.1 1(A)(1), provides that “[a]

judge

shall disqualify

himself 0r herself in a proceeding in Which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to instances Where: (a) (1) the judge has a personal bias or

prejudice concerning a party.”

The

right to an impartial jurist

is

a “basic requirement 0f due process.” In re Murchison,

349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Under federal constitutional jurisprudence, courts evaluate whether a
“serious risk 0f actual bias,’ based 0n objective perceptions and considering

5

all

the circumstances

alleged, rises to an unconstitutional. See

(2009); Rippo

Baker, 580 U.S.

v.

asks not Whether the judge

is

Caperton

—, 137

v.

A.T.

S.Ct. 905,

Massey Coal

907 (2017). Put

actually, subjectively biased, but

C0,, 556 U.S. 868, 884

differently, “[t]he

Court

whether the average judge

in his

[0r her] position is ‘likely’ t0

be neutral, 0r whether there

bias.”’ Caperton,

88 1. Not only must judges actually be neutral, they must appear so

556 U.S.

at

is

an unconstitutional ‘potential for

as well.

The record shows

that this

fundamental precept was violated here.

D. Denialﬂﬂaingﬂrial
Appellant was denied a

trial

by jury. He protested

this in the trial court

and

in his

opening

brief here.

As noted
demand

is

in the

opening

brief, this is

required. See I.R.C.P. 38(d)

not an ordinary civil case, in which a formal jury

(“A party waives a jury

properly served and filed.” Rather, as there noted, because
seeks a punitive ﬁne,

it is

Court

the right t0 jury

must be knowing,

its

brought by the

Vasquez, 163 Idaho 557, 416 P.3d 108 (2018)

stated: “[I]n criminal cases trial courts

trial,

unless

demand
state

is

and the

state

properly characterized as a criminal case.

On this point State v.
case, the

it is

trial

is

controlling. In that

must obtain a defendant's consent

t0

waive

not just from counsel, but from the defendant herself. Further, such waiver

intelligent

and voluntary. Failing to make these ﬁndings as

to the defendant

personally establishes a structural defect in the proceedings.” Id. at 563, 416 P.3d at 114

(citations omitted).

The conclusion portion 0f the Court’s opinion
obtain a personal waiver ofjury

trial

in

from the defendant,
6

Vasquez reads: “we hold that

failure t0

either orally 0r in writing in

open court

is

a structural defect, which constitutes fundamental error.”

Although the Court's conclusion
consistent with Article

made

in

open

I,

Section

in

7, the

Id. at

564, 416 P.3d at 115.

Vasquez expressly contemplates a written waiver,

Court's conclusion also states that the waiver

must be

court. Neither occurred here.

Simply

put, there is

no indication

that Appellant

waived

his right in a

knowing,

voluntary manner. See Vasquez, 163 Idaho at 562, 416 P.3d at 113. Appellate courts carefully

waived

scrutinize an assertion that a defendant has

his 0r her right to a jury trial

reasonable presumption should be indulged against
97, 101, 753 P.2d 833,

837

(Ct.

is

v.

Wheeler, 114 Idaho

made

it

impossible for

him to defend the

case.

required where “the denial 0f discovery resulted in actual and substantial

prejudice t0 the complaining litigant.” Gile

1996)

waiver. See State

App. 1988).

Appellant was denied discovery, Which
Reversal

its

and every

v.

United Airlines, Inc.

,

95 F.3d 492, 495 (7th

Cir.

).

The

control of discovery

is

Within the discretion 0f the

Dairyland Insurance C0., 131 Idaho 357, 956 P.2d 674

Local 6

v.

trial court.

(citing Service

See Vaught

Employees

v.

Int'l

Union,

Idaho Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 683 P.2d 404 (1984)). In

reviewing whether the

trial

court abused

its

discretion in refusing to delay proceedings for further

discovery this Court must consider: (1) Whether the

one 0f discretion;

(2)

Whether the

trial

trial

court reached

its

court correctly perceived the issue as

court acted Within the outer boundaries 0f its discretion

and consistently with the legal standards applicable
Whether the

trial

decision

to the specific choices available t0

it;

and

(3)

by an exercise 0f reason. See Eagle Water Company,
7

Inc.

v.

Roundy Pole Fence Company,

Sun Valley Shopping Center

v.

Inc.,

134 Idaho 626, 628, 7 P.3d 1103, 1105 (2000)

Idaho Power C0., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).

Since the court considered none 0f these factors,
law.

(citing

it

abused

its

discretion as a matter of

Conclusion
For the reasons
Dated:

March

18,

stated, the

judgment must be reversed and the case dismissed.
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